This is the fifth installment in a series of interviews with scholars and experts on China as a resurgent Asian power that is changing the regional order. This installment looks into China’s threat perceptions and its military strategy and modernization. -- Ed.


China’s “strategic culture” is a complex mixture of Confucianism, the revolutionary aspect and the West’s realist streak, raising uncertainties over its possible responses to security threats including one related to the ongoing South China Sea disputes, according to China expert Park Chang-hee.

Strategic culture refers to the orientation of a country’s perceptions and preferences regarding the use of force and its overall security stance.

China’s historical experiences including its communist revolution and wars with Western forces have made its strategic culture “unstable and unpredictable,” the military strategy professor at Korea National Defense University said during a recent interview with The Korea Herald.

“It is difficult to simply define China’s strategic culture in which these three elements clash together. The problem is the unpredictability of the strategic culture. Even Chinese cannot fully grasp their own strategic culture,” he said.

“China could be confused about whether it should take a more generous approach in line with the Confucian strategic culture, or a tough stance in line with the revolutionary strategic culture.”

Touching on the heightened tensions between the U.S. and China over the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, the scholar did not rule out the possibility of a direct military clash between the major powers.

“Should this war of nerves between the two persist, we cannot rule out the possibility of a military conflict. We witnessed a clash in April 2001 when the U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with China’s fighter jet off Hainan Island, causing the death of a Chinese pilot.”

The following is the interview with professor Park.


Korea Herald: What are your views on China’s perception of military threats?
Park Chang-hee: China issued a 2014 defense white paper, entitled “China’s Military Strategy” in May this year. The document adopts a new expression -- “military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation” -- in place of the previous term -- “military strategic guideline of active defense for the new era.” This change reflects a shift in China’s perception of the security landscape. 

The “new era” in the previous term refers to China’s pursuit of the operations of its forces under high-tech conditions. But the “new situation” refers to neo-hegemonism, power politics and neo-interventionism (which the white paper singled out as new threats). Here, neo-hegemonism means the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance, while power politics refers to the U.S.’ military rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region and neo-interventionism to the U.S.’ intervention in maritime disputes involving the East and South China Seas. China appears to be concentrating on these issues as focal points for its construction of military power.


KH: Since 1985, China has pushed for its military modernization. What have been the key points of the modernization scheme?
Park: In 1985 when Deng Xiaoping presided over a session of the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, there was a shift in China’s perception of warfare. Before then, China’s military prepared for a possible all-out, impending nuclear war. But at the CMC session, Deng and senior party members shared the recognition that the possibility of such an all-out nuclear war was little. Thus, they began pursuing the doctrine of “local wars” whereby China sought to secure its interests along its peripheral regions. A local war is of short duration that is a geographically limited yet of high-intensity. 

To pursue the doctrine of local wars, China should have elite forces equipped with high-tech weapons. But for the doctrine, China just reduced its troops by some 1 million and sought to enhance jointness among the armed services. But the Gulf War (in 1991) -- which some called the first space war -- came as a shock, underscoring the yawning technological gap between the U.S. and China. 

Since then, China started pursuing the technology-focused construction of military power in a departure from the manpower-centric strategy. Accordingly, the military doctrine of “local wars under high-tech conditions” emerged in 1993. As the world has moved into the era of informationization in the 21st century from the industrialization era, China has been transitioning to informationized warfare from mechanized warfare. In 2004, China’s defense white paper set its military objective as winning “local wars under informationized conditions.” Local wars under high-tech conditions means mechanized warfare in the industrialization era, while local wars under informationized conditions is informationized warfare.

Under the military strategic guideline of active defense in the new situation, China will be preparing for local wars under informationized conditions until the mid-21st century, namely 2050. This objective was presented in the 2006 defense white paper. What this means is that China is pushing to secure military capabilities equivalent to those of the U.S.


KH: A series of the military events have driven China’s projects to alter or improve its military strategy, doctrine, force structure, training and so forth. Those events include the Gulf War in 1991 and the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1995-96 to name a few.
Park: Yes, the Gulf War made China cognizant of the importance of the high-tech weaponry. But in the early 1990s, China focused on preparing for contingencies along its periphery rather than for an emergency involving the U.S. But after the Taiwan Straits Crisis, China pursued a shift in its military strategy, and the management and acquisition of weapons. During the crisis, the U.S. sent two aircraft carriers, which was quite a shock to China. Since then, it started to prepare for military operations with the potential clash with the U.S. in mind. 

China’s military preparations proceeded in two ways. Firstly, China has pursued the doctrine of local wars under informationized conditions to catch up with the U.S. based on the recognition that an emergency on its periphery could involve not only neighboring states but also the U.S. Secondly, China has sought to develop the “A2/AD” (anti-access/area-denial) strategy, which is an asymmetric military strategy. China would not pursue the A2/AD strategy for good. It is pushing for the A2/AD strategy as it is lagging behind the U.S. military power. Thus, its pursuit of the strategy is an inevitable choice.


KH: China appears to be employing an offensive maritime strategy as it seeks to shift its focus to “offshore waters defense” to the combination of offshore waters defense and “open seas protection.” What would be the impact of this on the regional security?
Park: China’s strategy can hardly be called offensive. It is almost impossible for China to execute an offensive strategy against its major competitors, the U.S. and Japan. If you call a strategy offensive, it should be aimed at extorting something from its competitors or anything to that effect. Thus, it is appropriate to call China’s strategy defensive. But it is not to say that there is no offensiveness at all in its strategy, or that it is not seeking to bolster its offensive capabilities. As China rises as a major power, it cannot help but strengthen its military power to protect growing national interests. In this respect, China has been trying to build its capabilities in the realms of sea, air and space. 

In the 2014 defense white paper, China used the expression, “open seas protection” that goes beyond the “offshore defense” that it has stuck to for two decades. This indicates that China would advance farther into the ocean in the future. The problem here is that even though it takes a defensive strategy, China would not make any concessions vis-a-vis core interests and could use force (to protect them). The core interests involve Senkaku Islands, Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Taiwan and even North Korea. 


KH: Tensions have spiked in the South China Sea with the U.S. conducting freedom-of-navigation operations. What would be the likelihood of a military clash between China and the U.S.?
Park: China’s defense white paper said the seas and oceans bear on the enduring peace, lasting stability and sustainable development of China. It also made it clear that it would strengthen its maritime military readiness to secure its interests. In line with this, China has apparently been constructing artificial islands in the South China Sea and deployed military assets there. The U.S. has said in response that China’s moves ran counter to the international law and would not be helpful for the regional stability.

Should this war of nerves between the two persist, we cannot rule out the possibility of a military conflict. We witnessed a clash in April 2001 when the U.S. surveillance aircraft collided with China’s fighter jet off Hainan Island, causing the death of a Chinese pilot. A clash may not escalate into a full-blown military conflict, but such a war of nerves would undercut mutual trust and dampen the mood for cooperation that was forged during their summit in September.


KH: How would you describe China’s strategic culture?
Park: China’s strategic culture is based on Confucianism. Under the Confucian strategic culture, war is a means that is to be abhorred and should be used in an inevitable situation as a last resort. When a war breaks out, the scale and duration should also be minimized.

This traditional strategic culture is different from the modern West’s notion about warfare. The West regards war as a means to achieve political objectives and the execution of warfare as part of political activities. This means that war is not a subject to be abhorred, but a justifiable means to achieve political goals. This is what differentiates the West’s notion from that of Confucianism.

But China experienced a communist revolution, which has implanted a very extreme realist strategic culture in China. Through the revolution, China has come to see warfare as a means to achieve political goals -- a just and rational means to root out feudalism and imperialism.

The problem is that after China succeeded in its communist revolution and established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, another strategic culture emerged. That came as China engaged in the international war and accepted the West’s strategic culture. That means a modern-day limited warfare aimed at securing national interests.

As a result, China’s strategic culture is now an intricate mixture of Confucianism, the aspect of the communist revolution and the West’s strategic culture. Thus, it is difficult to simply define China’s strategic culture in which these three elements clash together. The problem is the unpredictability of the strategic culture. Even Chinese cannot fully grasp their own strategic culture.

It is hard to know which cultural aspect could figure prominently in what case. In case of the South China Sea disputes, China could be confused about whether it should take a more generous approach in line with the Confucian strategic culture, or a tough stance in line with the revolutionary strategic culture. China could be grappling with its identity of strategic culture. In this respect, China claims multiple identities. For example, at the U.N. Security Council, China acts as a major power, while at a climate change conference, China claims to be a developing country.


KH: Chinese leader Xi Jinping has announced the plan for a reduction of 300,000 troops. What is your view on the troop drawdown?
Park: Before China renounced its concept of the imminent, all-out, nuclear war in 1985, China maintained some 4 million troops. As it pursued the doctrine of local wars, China curtailed its troop level by 1 million from 1985-89, then 500,000 from 1997-2000 and then 200,000 from 2003-05. Now, the number of the troops stands at around 2.3 million.

China’s military modernization is the biggest reason for the troop reduction. As the military is getting mechanized and informationized, what has become crucial is not the number of the troops but the quality of its forces. Secondly, it is about jointness among the armed services, which has created the synergic effect. Enhanced jointness has allowed the military to eliminate the overlapping functions. The military has also sought to remove its roles that caused inefficiencies such as the socialist military establishment’s traditional function of employment.


KH: How do you think the Sino-U.S. military competition will unfold?
Park: China’s military can’t be a match for the U.S. yet. It can’t be for some two to three decades. Thus, China can’t think of a scenario of its military clash with the U.S. for the time being. But this does not mean that China would bow to the U.S.’ military threats. Therefore, it is taking a strategic approach to deal with the U.S.

China’s strategy is formulated based on its analysis of the U.S.’ vulnerabilities. First, it knows that it would take some period of time for the U.S. to prepare for a war. In the case of the Gulf War, it took some five months of preparation. Secondly, it would also take time for the U.S. to deploy its military assets to a battle zone. Of course, the aircraft would come soon, but the aircraft carrier group or warships can’t arrive right away. Thirdly, China is aware that the U.S.’ war is susceptible to domestic public opinion.

Thus, China believes it would win in a conflict should it effectively block the U.S.’ military power. Based on this belief, China has been pursuing the A2/AD strategy, and focusing on developing weapons systems required for the strategy. The problem for the U.S. is that neighboring states can raise doubts over the U.S.’ security commitment to them as the A2/AD strategy poses a threat to the U.S. Thus, the U.S. is pushing for its military rebalancing to maintain its alliance system in the region.

The Sino-U.S. competition will continue. But China would not engage in some infinite military competition with the U.S. in the way the Soviet Union did during the Cold War. Rather than trying to maximize the number of warheads, it would take a smart approach such as increasing its submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic nuclear-powered submarines.


KH: There has been talk here of China’s possible intervention in case of a regime collapse in Pyongyang or any contingencies in the North. How do you think China would intervene?
Park: North Korea has historically been of core geopolitical value for China. Thus, what’s in China’s interest is to maintain a pro-China regime in the North. The worst scenario for China would be that a pro-U.S. regime emerges on the peninsula after reunification, posing a security threat to China. Under this scenario, it could be seen as being geopolitically encircled by Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, which could make it difficult for it to fulfil the task of unifying mainland China and Taiwan.

China’s intervention during the Korea War was based on such geopolitical calculations. At the time, all countries including the U.S. thought China would not intervene due to domestic political and economic difficulties, and the fact that China was not prepared to participate in yet another war. But it did. Should a contingency occur in the North, China would intervene in any form. Its intervention could occur in various ways, depending on situations. China could send a delegation of political and military advisers to back the North Korean regime, or send military assistance to block internal resistance (to the regime favorable to China’s interests), or intervene militarily in a direct manner, in the worst case.

Russia has recently begun its military intervention to protect the Assad regime in Syria. Likewise, China could offer military support in case of the collapse of the North Korean regime. Currently, the document stipulating the alliance relations between China and North Korea still remains undestroyed. It appears that the document has not been discarded yet for the two sides to prepare for the possibilities (mentioned above).

By Song Sang-ho (sshluck@heraldcorp.com)


**Park Chang-hee

Park, professor in the department of military strategy at Korea National Defense University, is noted for his extensive research and expertise on Chinese military strategy, national security, geopolitics and war strategy.  

He has authored a series of articles and books on the Chinese military and various security issues. His publications include “Why China Attacks: China’s Geostrategic Vulnerability and Its Military Intervention,” “Enhanced Sino-Russian Relations and Its Implications for the Security of South Korea” and “On Military Strategy.”

He previously lectured at Korea University and Sogang University. He also served as an adviser to the National Unification Advisory Council. 

He graduated from the Korea Military Academy in 1987. He obtained his master’s degree in national security from the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 1996 and a doctorate in politics from Korea University in 2001.